All indices representing space and time are de…ned in table A.1. We distinguish two seasons denoted by : the wet season (w) and the dry season (d); and two main regions denoted by i = 1; 2, where region 1 lies upstream of region 2. Region 2 is divided into two subregions denoted r: the mainstream (m) river and its tributaries (t). Within each (sub)region, we allow for an endogenous number of dams that are denoted by h = 1; 2; : : :, which will be ordered by descending hydropower generating productivity below. The economic costs and bene…ts arising from the annual inundation of Tonle Sap and the estuary will be directly related to the combined river ‡ow leaving the two subregions of downstream during the wet 1
season. The associated water ‡ows are determined ex-post and will be kept outside the speci…cation of the model. In each subregion i; r at season , industry and households withdraw x 1;w; of water, hydropower generation uses q 1;r;h; of water at dam h that is reusable further downstream, and the dam operator stores y i;r of water in the wet season for the dry season.
Due to evaporation losses, only i;r y i;r , i;r 2 (0; 1), 1 can be used in the dry season. In region i, irrigated agriculture withdraws i i;d of water in the dry season, the wet season out ‡ow from dams o i;w fosters regional …sh reproduction, and o 2;w ‡ushes salinity in the estuary. The MRB has already existing dam capacity for these economic activities and a lot of plans for expanding capacity. In subregion i; r, existing (aggregate) dam capacity is denoted D 0 i;r and (aggregate) dam capacity expansion D i;r , where both are measured in km 3 . Finally, total basin-wide water available is determined by total basin-wide precipitation or water (in) ‡ows that is attributed to subregion i; r and season by the parameter i;r; .
A good understanding of dam capacity is crucial for understanding the model. First, the interpretation of dam capacity in both Haddad (2011) and our model is that if hydropower generation is two units in the wet season and one unit in the dry season, then dam capacity has to be two units, which is the maximum of one and two. Furthermore, recall we have a static annual model with two seasons that mimics an annual cycle in the year 2030. Then, we assume that planning and starting constructing dams will be completed before 2030. Dam expansion should be based on the trade o¤ between bene…ts and building (and other) costs.
1 Haddad (2011) assumes a single dam and that there are no evaporation losses, i.e. all i;r = 1. at the second dam etc. only requires max h fq i;m;h; g of water to operate all dams. For dams of tributaries in region i; t at season , the amount P h q i;t;h; of water is needed to operate all dams. Note that a cascade of mainstream dams is more e¢ cient in terms of water use because P h q i;t;h; > max h fq i;m;h; g. There is no di¤erence in the capacity that each type of dams requires and, therefore, the associated dam capacity is at least P h q i;r;h; independent of r = m; t. The existing dams of region 1 are a cascade of mainstream dams, and all existing dams of region 2 are dams in tributaries of the LMB. (i; r = 2; t) are modelled similarly as upstream, except that seasonal in ‡ows are equal to 2;t;w and 2;t;d from precipitation, and water use for hydropower generation becomes P h fq 2;m;h; g instead of max h fq 2;m;h; g. The equations describing the tributaries are stated in the lower part of table A.4 and we forego further discussion. This completes the description of the water balances. of the bene…t functions for hydropower generation is involved and a discussion is deferred to Appendix B. This appendix also contains details about the calibration of the cost functions. Given these bene…t and cost functions, the other bene…t functions and parameters were calibrated directly from the …rst-order conditions determining the disagreement point (discussed below), where we assume weak governance for downstream. The satiation level of irrigation was chosen to coincide with the plans for the future, presuming that these plans seen in isolation re ‡ect a realistic cost-bene…t trade o¤.
The salinity issues are concentrated in the estuary, downstream of any planned dam construction. The wet season river ‡ow partly ‡ows into Tonle Sap in Cambodia, where it fosters the world largest inland …sh resource, and the remaining part ‡ows to the estuary ‡ushing salinity from agricultural land. In the dry season, the constant river ‡ow from Tonle Sap to the estuary minimizes salt water intrusion (Campbell, 2009 ). In our model, the intake by Tonle Sap (and wetlands) in the wet season is modeled ex-post as 87:000 o 2;w = o 2;w , where o 2;w is current river out ‡ow and 87:000 km 3 is our estimate of Tonle Sap capacity to store water. This linear relation allows us to relate the losses due to reduced ‡ushing of salinity in the estuary directly in terms of the wet season ‡ow o 2;w . We assume that twenty per cent less o 2;w would destroy irrigated agriculture in the estuary (Campbell, 2009 This completes the description of costs and bene…ts of water use. Losses agriculture due to salinity
The Nash bargaining solution
The asymmetric Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950; Kalai 1977 ) that we apply in our analysis maximizes an objective function that depends on the regions' net bene…ts, disagreement points, and bargaining weights.
As discussed in the main text, upstream maximizes its own regional net bene…t and this determines its disagreement utility (4) + (5) + economic bene…t …shery losses externalities (6) speci…es the disagreement point under weak governance.
As one of the scenarios, we also consider the case in which downstream has strong governance. This is modeled similarly as for upstream. Given in ‡ows from upstream, downstream under strong governance maximizes its own regional net bene…t and this determines its disagreement utility
arg max w 2 ( ) ; s.t. all equations of table A.4.
A measure for the welfare loss of weak governance in the LMB is the di¤erence d ; 1) is upstream's bargaining weight and 1 is downstream's weight. Formally, the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is given by the unique maximizer of the following program:
s.t. all equations of tables A.3 and A.4.
e¤ective operation time determines energy generated in Mjoule, from which GWh follows:
M Joule = 2:280 10 7 M W; GW h = 1 3:6 10 6 M Joule:
The obtained estimates required some scaling down to match our sparse data on GWh per region and type of dam (mainstream versus tributary). The reason for the overestimation is that the height of the dam is larger than the average height of the water in the dam and the latter determines the GWh.
Next, for each region and type of dam, we ordered our dam data by descending average productivity GWh per km 3 from which we constructed another data set with cumulative km 3 and cumulative GWh, where both were calculated on a monthly basis. Scatter diagrams reveal an almost perfect quadratic relation f (x) = x (a bx). Ordinary least square estimation determines our coe¢ cients a and b for each region and type of dam with an R 2 of 0:931 or above. Finally, Thailand pays Laos a price of 0:013 million US$ per GWh for electricity from the Nam Theun 2 dam, which we used as a proxy for the electricity price throughout the entire basin.
Dams are heterogeneous. This is captured as follows. First, we impose an average hydropower generating capacity per dam, say x. Second, we assume that each …rst dam per region and type generates hydropower x 1 according to our estimated cumulative bene…t function up to its maximum capacity, that is x 1 (a bx 1 ) for x 1 x. Then, the second dam starts to generate hydropower x 2 and follows the estimated cumulative curve between one and two times the maximum dam capacity, that is x 2 (a 2b x bx 2 ) for x x 2 2 x, etc. Then, it is as if hydropower generation from dam h is given by x h (a (h 1) 2b x bx h ) for h x x 2 (h + 1) x. This explains the expressions for hydropower generation in tables A.5 and A.6. Note that this way of modeling orders all dams per region and type by descending (marginal) productivity. In the optimum, the most productive dams will be used for hydropower generation.
For four mainstream dams in China and …ve tributary dams in Laos, we have retrieved building costs. Applying the same procedure as above, we obtain scatter diagrams that reveal an almost perfect quadratic relation f (x) = cx 2 . After the estimation, we rescaled these cost functions such that future plans for hydropower generation maximize the net economic bene…t x (a bx) cx 2 . Rescaling is necessary because otherwise dam expansion for hydropower generation would be unpro…table. The estimated cost functions are presented in tables A.5 and A.6.
Dam capacity disrupts …sh migration and …sh reproduction and the exact e¤ects are unknown but huge. For downstream, we assume that constructing all mainstream dams of the LMB damages …shery by 80% of its current economic bene…t and all tributary dams damages …shery by only 10%. For upstream, we assume 20%. We calibrated the cost coe¢ cient of cx 2 per region and type of dam by equating this function to the assumed loss and taking x equal to the cumulative future hydropower generation for the associated region and type of dam from our calculated data set.
